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The generous exclusion of Ottoman-Islamic Europe: British
press advocacy of Turkish EU membership
Derek Bryce*
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK
This article explores commentary in UK newspapers which, while
sympathetic to the notion of Turkish EU membership, still deploys a
discourse that remains exclusionary where assumptions of Turkey’s intrinsic
cultural and civilisational ‘Europeanness’ are concerned. Turkish member-
ship is advocated as a sort of strategic supplement to a historical ontology of
‘Europe’ proceeding from a grand narrative of Latin Christendom –
Reformation – Enlightenment – Modernity (adorned with the selective
appropriation of Classical antiquity), superimposed upon a wider historico-
cultural and religious milieu. Membership is supported on the basis that
Turkey is an exceptional case, considered on the instrumental grounds of
guaranteeing Turkish secular democracy within the context of EU
institutions while presenting an ‘example’ to the wider Islamic ‘world’.
Support for membership does not proceed from assumptions that Turkey may
possess an existing, intrinsic, historically locatable European ‘right’, implied
by the extension of the EU into Ottoman successor states in south-eastern
Europe as well as Cyprus. The potential for the deployment of this latter
discourse to support Turkish membership from an assumed a priori cultural
and historical European belonging is explored.
Keywords: Turkey; Islam; Europe; orientalism; subjectivity
A sad story of lovers never reunited. Just like the two sides of the Galata Bridge,
hands that reach out to each other but never touch. The irresistible exotic desire of
East and West destined never to unite. The letters are in English. This love is lived
in the language of the West. Is it the same old story of the West distracting the East
with its words of love? [Orhan Cem C¸etin; exhibitor: Istanbul Gallery of Modern
Art; cited in O¨zendes (2007)]
Introduction
In The return of the religious: Revisiting Europe and its Islamic others,
Yeg˘enog˘lu (2006, 254) argued in this journal that European values, based on a set
of ostensibly secular cultural markers, are in fact a displacement and discursive
reformulation of Christendom’s particular anxiety about Islam and used
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as a position from which to argue against Turkey’s admission to the European
Union. In building her conceptual framework for this discourse of exclusion
vis-a`-vis Turkey, Yeg˘enog˘lu draws on the point made in Gerard Delanty’s 1995
study, Inventing Europe that ‘Europe’, as it is generally conceptualised within
this debate, may indeed be a ‘secular surrogate for Christendom’ (Yeg˘enog˘lu
2006, 249). This sublimated resort to Christendom, she suggests, inhibits Europe
from projecting itself into a non-exclusionist future. She asks of Europe
(Yeg˘enog˘lu 2006, 259), ‘what do you want to be? Do you want to be a
multicultural and democratic Europe or do you want to be the old, exclusive
Europe united in Christianity?’.
This subject position, seeking to reformulate and project itself into the
universal is actually dependent upon a quite local history of a secularising
critique of existing discourses within Western Christendom that leaves much of
the latter’s socio-cultural legacy in place. It is placed in crisis when demands for
inclusion in secular modernity are informed by ‘non-Western’ subjectivities
rather than a simple willingness by them to receive and implement a didactic,
normative ‘Western-ness’. As Anidjar (2006, 74–76) maintains, Islam was not
simply treated as an alien religion in pre-Enlightenment Western Christendom,
but as a competing, ‘false’ experience of Christianity itself and was therefore
singled out for particular excoriation. He goes on to argue that, as Western
Christendom reborn, secularism maintains that ontology despite its claims to the
universal and that, therefore, ‘Islam is to Europe what religious criticism is to
secular criticism, what religion is to secularism’ (Anidjar 2006, 75).
My intention here is to accept the validity of Yeg˘enog˘lu’s argument about the
current, constitutive presence of religion in discourses underwriting ostensibly
secular notions of inclusion and exclusion where ‘Europe’ is concerned but
nevertheless to suggest that it might be productively responded to in ways other
than the zero sum game of a choice between appeals to past or future with which
she concludes her article. My own suggestion is that a ‘European’ reappraisal of
the past, taking into account the constitutive presence of Orthodoxy and
Byzantium, might first undermine the notion that a single, unifying Christendom
is coterminous with ‘Europe’. Following from that, the European Islamic legacy
of the Ottoman Empire confers upon Turkey a claim of ‘right’ to an intrinsic,
historically locatable, Europeanness. In doing so, I align with the latter of what
Baban and Keyman (2008, 117) identify as two general approaches to the
advocacy of Turkish EU membership: Europe transcending historical boundaries,
looking towards a cosmopolitan future by making room for its constituted ‘other’
(per Yeg˘enog˘lu), or a reappraisal of the past to acknowledge already existing
Byzantine and Ottoman constitutive legacies in contemporary Europe.
Therefore, Delanty’s (2003, 15) claim that Europe is not exclusively constituted
by a familiar teleology of Latin Christendom – Renaissance – Reformation –
Enlightenment – Modernity, but is in fact a tripartite set of civilisational
constellations, is apposite. He states, ‘I propose that in European history, there
have been three civilisational constellations that have been constitutive of modernity
D. Bryce298
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Br
yc
e,
 D
er
ek
] 
At
: 
14
:2
7 
5 
No
ve
mb
er
 2
00
9
in Europe. These are: (1) the Occidental Christian constellation, (2) the Byzantine,
Slavic, Eurasian constellation and (3) the Ottoman Islamic constellation
(Delanty 2003, 16). Therefore, the possibility exists to advocate Turkish EU
membership, or at least recognition of its extra-institutional cultural Europeanness,
with an appeal for recognition that aspects of this identity can already be located in
the past. This cannot, however, be accomplished by simply measuring Turkey
against a perennially contestable historical ontology of what is and is not ‘Europe’.
Rather, the task is also to draw attention to the historicity of the subject positions that
survey, appropriate and deploy the resources of the past to construct such ontologies
in the first place.
In this illustrative analysis of British newspaper commentary during the
run-up to the commencement of Turkey’s EU accession talks in 2005, I will
explore the durable presence of discourses of exclusion, not as they might
reasonably be expected to appear in arguments against Turkish membership, but
in pieces which advocate it from a position not dissimilar to that favoured by
Yeg˘enog˘lu. This contextual focus is instrumental in allowing me to make
theoretical suggestions about how empirically evaluative, technical consider-
ations have been bound up with a set of symbolic assumptions concerning
‘Europe’ whose regional specificity and historical contingency are nonetheless
effaced, allowing Turkish membership to be advocated as a strategic supplement
for Europe but with no a priori recognition of Turkey’s claim to an intrinsic,
historically locatable, European ‘right’ anterior to its EU aspirations.
Contested discourses of exclusion: The liminal position of Turkey in a
(Western) ontology of Europe
The evaluation of Turkey’s EU aspirations based on compliance with legal,
economic, institutional, human rights and democratic standards ‘conceals certain
cultural and symbolic elements that – even if invoked mainly in passing –
nevertheless determine the basic script for the Turkish candidacy’ (Amiraux
2004, 67–68). Yılmaz (2005, 4) identifies persistent narratives of exclusion
where the initial point of demarcation was religion, succeeded by ‘civilisation’
and latterly ‘culture’ with a brief Cold War interlude, ‘during which European
rejectionism vis-a`-vis Turkey appears to have been temporarily suspended under
the exigencies of the survival instinct’. This recourse to the abstract where
Turkey is concerned is famously notable in the seventeenth and eighteenth
century projection of ‘despotism’ as a negative benchmark for ideals of the
Enlightenment state onto a largely theoretical East. The exemplar for this
‘Oriental Despotism’ was, Montesqieu’s Persian letters notwithstanding, the
Ottoman court, or at least a wilfully imagined version of it (Marana 1970;
Montesquieu 1993; Grosrichard 1998, 31; C¸irakman 2005, 117).
These acts of exclusion indicate, in the ‘European’ subject position
undertaking them, what Zˇizˇek (1989, 49) calls ‘a totality set on effacing the traces
of its own impossibility’ given that they exist discursively alongside a shared
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material historical experience with a European Ottoman milieu. Rodinson
(1988), Cardini (1999) and Goody (2004) offer general accounts of Islam’s
position within and in relation to European culture from eighth century
Al-Andalus onwards while Goffman (2002) and I˙nalcık (2006) highlight the
specifically Ottoman role, as a political, religious and cultural European presence
from the fourteenth century in Greece, the Balkans and subsequently Hungary.
Navaro-Yashin (2002, 8–9) observes that in the ‘longstanding European
historiography that assigned the Ottoman Empire to ‘the East’, ‘Turkey and
Europe’ are still conceived both within and outside Turkey as a contradiction in
terms’. Yet, she maintains, this is undermined by ‘the Ottoman Empire and
Turkey’s historical placement within and vis-a`-vis Europe’ (Navaro-Yashin
2002). Similarly, the historian, Faroqhi (2006, 25), faced with the choice of
categorising the Ottoman state as integrated with or radically external from its
European contemporaries, observes with bracing candour that the latter option
‘is certainly not impossible to legitimise our procedures but our task would be a
good deal harder, and I choose to take the easy way out’. That the liminal position
of Turkey in relation to certain constructed notions of a historical ‘Europe’ is
itself an artefact of such perennially contested discourses is readily apparent in
critical academic debate on the topic but less so in other spheres of cultural
production, such as news coverage. There, notions of the settled ontological
nature of the past insofar as it informs commentary on Turkey’s (and indeed
Islam’s) relationship with, and place within, Europe are still in currency. This
discourse of historically informed ‘right’ may be traced and responded to, not
necessarily with refutation, but with a counterclaim of ‘right’ and a concomitant
demand for Turkey’s inclusion in a European past as well as future.
The utility of the past: Foucault and ‘histories of the present’
Hobsbawm (1997, 13) notes that ‘to be a member of any human community is to
situate oneself with regard to one’s (its) past, if only by rejecting it’. Despite the
turn towards critiques of ‘the doctrine of the primacy and autonomy of facts in
history’, (Carr 1987, 9, 20), Hobsbawm (1997, 27) notes the persistence of
metaphysical, as opposed to socially constructed notions of ‘history’, stating that:
‘the sense of the past as a collective continuity of experience remains surprisingly
important, even to those most dedicated to innovation and the belief that novelty
equals improvement.’ Munslow (2006, 12), meanwhile, iterates the social-
constructivist perspective that, ‘because history is written by historians, it is best
understood as a cultural product existing within society, and as part of the
historical process, rather than an objective methodology and commentary outside
of society’. Therefore, particular versions of the past, offered by and to subjects in
the social world, are themselves historical contingencies. So too are the
circumstances governing their availability for deployment in any given period
meaning that, ‘the representability of a particular aspect of the past has its own
history’ (Rigney 2001, 94). My critical focus here is not the professional writing
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of history, but rather the uses made of the past in extra-disciplinary spheres of
cultural production; in this case, news coverage and associated commentary
(Davies 2006, 249). Therefore, the task is to trace the historical conditions within
which ‘history’ is deployed and circulated in a given textual or institutional
context.
Michel Foucault conceived of discursive and material events in history, as not
simply points on a linear sequence, dependent upon and referring principally to
immediate antecedents and successors, but as contingencies made possible by
lateral and oblique relations to other events (Flynn 1994, 29–34). Said (1997,
290) describes Foucault’s methodological approach as ‘antidynastic, not the
continuation of a line from privileged origin to present consciousness [but rather]
adjacency, complementarity and correlation, which are not the same as the linear
relationships of succession and interiority’. In fact, ‘the cooler and more clinical
term “displacement” is substituted for the conventional idea of “progress”’ in
Foucault’s work (Burke 2005, 157).
This historicising approach transcends its potential utility in enriching and
adding nuance to the study of the past. As Roth (1981, 43) explains, by writing
‘histories of the present’, demonstrating the nonlinear contingency of events in
the past and by ‘conceiv[ing] of the present as that which is itself almost history’,
the claims to inevitability of contemporary discourses and practices may be
questioned. So, in studies of madness, clinical medicine and criminality, Foucault
(1991, 2001, 2003), shows them functioning in modes quite specifically related to
the power/knowledge conditions of given historical epistemes such as the
Renaissance, Classical/Enlightenment and Modernity (Foucault 2002a). This
allowed Foucault, as Roth (1981, 43) explains, ‘to cut them off from any field
which would have had some pristine access to truth’.
So, Foucault’s (2002b, 182) archaeological metaphor invites analysis based
on lateral and oblique relations among discursive objects within the layers of
historical ‘sediment’. It is less a case of digging downwards through successive
layers in a search for origins, than gazing at a cross section of resources
accessible at multiple points for correspondingly diverse motivations. This is not
to reproduce the positivist standpoint of the dispassionate observer positioned
outside something called ‘history’, but to suggest that the objectification of
something called ‘the past’ by a range of subject positions is itself constitutive of
an historical field. The past is a fundamentally renewable resource, constantly
replenished by contemporary discursive and material activity that, while made
possible and sustained through accessing, refining and utilising it, itself adds to
cumulative layers of ‘sediment’. It is to this, again drawing on Foucault, that
I now turn.
The prize of ‘right’ on a contested historical field: To speak ‘as’ Europe
Foucault (2004, 116) proposes that ‘tales of origins’ are not ‘tentative
histories . . . tangled up with old beliefs’, but rather discourses whose ‘function
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is not so much to record the past or to speak of origins as to speak of right, to
speak of power’s right’. Here, he refers to the utilisation of historical material by
subjectivities associated with, for example, class, language or ethnicity, to gain
position on a contested field of power. To Foucault, power is not simply a tool for
domination and has no deterministic objective status, but is a field upon which
subjectivities are formed, advance and retreat (Deleuze 1988, 59; Merquior 1991,
118) and where the potential agency of subordinate positions can never be
entirely effaced. Binaries of absolute domination and subordination would, in
fact, erase Foucault’s notion of power of which the potential for resistance is
partly constitutive (Simons 1995, 83). In this limited respect, it aligns with the
Gramscian idea of hegemony which ‘presupposes that account be taken of the
interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be
exercised’ (Gramsci 1999, 211).
Moving contextually closer to this study’s concerns, Edward Said’s (1978)
application of Foucauldian ideas underpinned his critique of the West’s
production of the Islamic ‘Orient’ as a discursive object made possible by
‘power’ functioning as a specifically Western epistemology (Said 1983, 222).
Said’s critics take him to task for emphasising the immutability of this binary to
the extent that it becomes ‘un-Foucauldian’, noting that the ‘Orient’ and sundry
‘others’ have occupied territory and asserted intrinsic agency on that discursive
field (Bhabha 1994; Sharafuddin 1994; Beaulieu and Roberts 2002; Varisco
2007). My own intention is not to interrogate Said’s thesis at length on this point,
but to note that he largely overlooks the liminal, disruptive positions that the
Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey occupy vis-a`-vis the reified notions
of Europe or the West that he criticises. These, I suggest, provoke an anxiety in
the subjectivity that produces the Orientalist enunciation not because of a
perennial, oppositional ‘otherness’ but because of their potential ‘right’ to occupy
territory on the same historical field. From this standpoint, Zˇizˇek (2007)
observed, ‘what makes the situation unpleasant is not Turkey’s “otherness”, but
its claim to sameness’.
In a struggle for ‘right’, the past can be drawn upon as a resource by
competing – or at least adjacent – parties to support and authorise the truth
claims of statements that establish and expand particular positions on a field of
power. In Society must be defended (1994), a 1976 course of lectures given at the
Colle`ge de France, Foucault illustrated this by outlining the struggle that took
place during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries amongst the absolute
monarchy, the nobility and the bourgeoisie for the ‘right’, locatable in ‘history’,
to constitute and articulate the French state. Foucault (2004, 236–37) argues that
having attained control of the state after 1789, the bourgeoisie did not stop at
asserting the legitimate primacy of its ‘right’ to articulate France, but ceased to
explicitly acknowledge the historical conditions of its own victory over other
contesters. Here, for the first time, people, nation and state are amalgamated in
one function of universality. Foucault (2004, 236) calls this the ‘self-
dialecticalisation of historical discourse’ in which history and philosophy
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began to ask the same question: ‘what is it, in the present, that is the agent of the
universal?’. The subject position that is able to ask this question does so after
effacing the very contingency of its emergence on a contestable historical field.
The utility of retroactively heralding the inevitability of some modern nation-
states in the cultural sphere has been studied by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983)
and Anderson (2006) while the appropriation of diverse, intertwined cultural
experience by a (paradoxically) Eurocentric standard of universalism, the very
theft of history, has been discussed by Goody (2006). As Habermas (1987,
261–62) notes, Foucault believed that the self-aware ‘modern’ subject is
simultaneously conscious of its finitude while still attempting to project or
transcend itself into the infinite with an ‘overloading’ or ‘doubling’ of the subject.
From a Lacanian perspective, Zˇizˇek (1989, 32–33) argues that subjects may be
well aware of the contingency of their social reality, but nonetheless, continue to
act otherwise by aligning with a fantasy of the obverse. Meanwhile, Rorty (1989,
93) identified the pretensions to the projection of the so-called universal values
as, ‘rather a local phenomenon [and] not associated with any power larger than
that embodied in a concrete historical situation’.
The incommensurability between the proclamation of universal notions like
civilisation and democracy and the insistence that these must, nonetheless, have a
location in something calling itself Europe or the West is, I suggest, present in
much of the discussion of Turkey’s EU candidacy considered in this article. This
is manifested by one subject position occupying sufficient territory on a field of
power to efface its own contingent historical emergence. My intention is not to
undermine such a discourse by measuring it solely against a particular benchmark
of empirical veracity, but to emphasise that the establishment of any such
standard is itself a historical contingency. Indeed, the dominant subjectivity and
associated discourse become that empirical standard as a prize of ‘right’ accorded
to the victor on a contested historical field. I will suggest that the news items
considered here, sympathetic to Turkey’s EU aspirations, proceed from such a
position.
Unlike the former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe and the successor states
of Yugoslavia, as Anderson (2008, 5) noted, in Turkey, the EU contemplates the
‘descendent of an imperial state, for long a far greater power than any kingdom of
the West’, and moreover one for whom Europe (the Persian frontier
notwithstanding) was the principle sphere of its strategic articulation as well as
the source of its administrative and military elites. The implications of that
Ottoman, and Islamic, imperial experience, not as encroachment upon an
imagined, anachronistic European ‘unity’ but as being historically partly
constitutive of a larger, current European diversity are rarely acknowledged in
mainstream news commentary. In response, by highlighting the Byzanti-
ne/Orthodox, Ottoman/Islamic past as the Turkish component in a shared
European historical experience I suggest that potential exists for a territorial
realignment on the discursive field of ‘Europe’. This might allow the prospect
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of Turkish EU membership to be considered from an already existing intrinsic
position of European ‘right’.
The British press and Turkey’s EU candidacy: The Turkish strategic
exception
Sources
A search was conducted with the LexisNexis database using two general key
terms, ‘Turkey’ and ‘European Union’, for a range of dates 1 month prior to, and
the immediate aftermath of, the date of formal commencement of membership
negotiations between the European Union and Turkey on 4 October 2005.
It confines itself to those pieces that are principally concerned with the grounds
for Turkey’s inclusion or exclusion from the EU which transcend technical and
institutional concerns, venturing, often obliquely, into questions of ‘history’,
‘culture’ and ‘Europe’. As Negrine et al. (2008, 53–54) observe, compared to the
French, the UK press does not dwell as reflexively on these areas. This invites the
question of how the pieces selected proceed from any notion of Europe when
such is rarely articulated in explicit terms. My suggestion throughout this article
will be that while they have transcended, or at any rate bypassed, the need for
specific acknowledgement of an association with an assumed civilisational grand
narrative, they are incomprehensible without an embedded assumption of what
Europe is that may refer less to an imminent cultural convergence that might
make room for Turkey than to immanent unities of historico-cultural experience
that will always exclude it, even if institutional membership is achieved.
The newspaper titles selected for analysis are The Guardian, The Times,
The Telegraph and The Independent as well as two Scottish broadsheets, The
Herald and The Scotsman. While fluid ideological points of demarcation within
this UK news sector have been observed in recent decades by McNair (2003,
175), these titles still constitute a (truncated) left to right spectrum and therefore
offer the potential for a corresponding diversity of views on a given story
(Reid 2001; Higgins 2006; Negrine et al. 2008). That these titles display a
consistency of opinion and embedded assumptions on the issue of Turkey and the
EU demonstrates the traction and durability of the associated discourses to which
they, in this case, adhere.
This section of the press was where critical discussion of Turkey’s EU
aspiration most often appeared, articulated to an abstract ‘citizen/reader/subject’
incompatible with the popular press’s ‘textual display of intimacy with idealised
individual readers’ (Conboy 2006, 10). Stokes and Reading (1999, 53) identify
the broadsheet sector’s continued claim to fulfil a ‘public enlightenment’
function, notwithstanding Habermas (1989, 188) claims to the contrary. At any
rate, Mouffe’s (1993, 71) notion of the social agent, ‘always precariously and
temporarily sutured at the intersection of . . . subject positions’ is useful in
underlining out that I deal with broadsheet newspapers’ invitation to a readership
to occupy a particular type of subjectivity as informed and fully engaged citizens
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(Bourdieu 1984, 443; Curran 2003, 93–96) and that receptions may not be
coterminous with ideal readerships constructed by media organisations
(Sarikakis 2004, 73).
Analysis
Turning now to specific items drawn from the selected newspaper titles, a range
of rationales for supporting Turkey’s EU membership ambitions can be readily
identified. Firstly, Turkey’s case can be advocated in terms of what it ‘has done
for Europe’ by highlighting its existing alignment with broadly defined ‘Western’
interests. Reid (2005) in The Herald praises Turkey on this basis, stating:
Since the foundation of the modern Turkish state by Atatu¨rk in 1923, the country
has steadily developed as a force for good in the world. It has become a steady and
reliable ally of NATO. Remarkably, it has shown friendship to Israel.
Meanwhile The Guardian (2005a) states that ‘Turkey, long a trusted member of
NATO, thought that its European “vocation” had been finally and definitively
recognised in 2003’.
Here, an unproblematic link between a general sense of Turkish virtue and the
specificities of its diplomatic and military relationships is made. In addition, for
Turkey, Europeanness is an aspiration that might yet be realised by diligent
compliance under an appraising EU gaze. This is not to argue against the veracity
of these statements which, in Foucauldian terms, are coherent and entirely
recognisable within their authorising discourse. Their legitimacy is proclaimed
when no causal link need be made between Turkey’s NATO membership and its
good relations with Israel as signifiers of the objective state of being a ‘force for
good in the world’. Here, it is productive to turn to Lacan’s notion of the
‘retroactivity of meaning’, outlined by Zˇizˇek (1989, 100–01), as the process by
which a certain master-signifier, in this case, ‘being a force for good in the
world’, intersects with a chain of signification that might include NATO
membership and cordial relations with Israel and retroactively gathers them
together as always already signifying itself. I suggest that this is compatible with
Foucault’s notion of the victorious subjectivity effacing its own contingency after
a struggle for ‘right’ on an historical field.
Support is also presented on the basis of Turkey’s perceived value as a
strategic supplement to be grafted on to a notion of Europe to which, nonetheless,
it has no intrinsic, historically grounded claim to belong. It would be ‘good for
Europe’ to accrue the symbolic benefit in presenting a secular, democratic
member with a majority Muslim citizenry to an allegedly hostile Islamic ‘world’.
This was the position attributed to then British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, by
Castle (2005) in The Independent on 9 September:
The Foreign Secretary . . . warned in a hard-hitting speech that snubbing Ankara’s
hopes would give ammunition to Islamic extremists; while welcoming it into the EU
would help avert a ‘clash of civilisations’ between the Muslim world and the West.
Failure to start EU negotiations on 3 October as scheduled could lead Europe into a
‘crisis on our own doorstep’, Mr Straw said.
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Turkey’s utility as a symbolic example to Muslims in distant South East Asia
was emphasised in The Scotsman on 3 October 2005, overlooking the more
proximate matter of six centuries of the Ottoman legacy in Europe itself:
To renege on the promises of EU membership to Turkey will be interpreted (rightly)
throughout the Islamic world as being anti-Muslim – just think of the implications
in bomb-ridden Indonesia which is struggling like Turkey to combine democracy
with Islam.
Turkey, meanwhile, can have the intrinsic features of its assigned cultural and
religious location mitigated by joining the constructed home of notions like
secularism, democracy, freedom of speech and religion. Therefore, The Guardian
was able to state that ‘it bears repeating that the magnet of EU membership
has already generated huge advances under the conservative government of
Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an’ (The Guardian 2005a). In the same newspaper on
26 September, Bunting (2005), in a piece titled ‘Regime change, European-style,
is a measure of our civilisation’ (emphasis added) initially does not differentiate
the case of Turkey from earlier examples of Spain and Portugal in considering the
democratising benefits of the EU accession process. Yet, she then invokes the
instrumental case for Turkey in bringing Islam in from the cold, so to speak,
stating:
If there was a secular, democratic economically successful Muslim state [in the EU]
it would kill off intense arguments about the incompatibility of Islam with
democracy or Islam with human rights and modernity . . . finally . . . it would
strengthen the claim of Europe’s 15 million-strong Muslim minority to a home in
Europe.
This leads back to a vision of Europe as a condition to be aspired to – not so
much a place but a series of universal values that are, nonetheless, specifically
located both geographically and historically. Smith (2008, 16) alludes to this
when he criticises those theorists of the modern nation-state who insist upon a
normative status for its civic-territorial form, while occluding its own
ethnocentric subject position and temporal specificity. It might be said that this
particular form of advocacy of the Turkish case constitutes a celebration of
‘Modernity coming home’ since ‘this conjoining of the ephemeral and the
fleeting with the eternal and immutable’ is, as Harvey (1990, 10) maintains, one
of its defining features.
Bunting’s suggestion that Turkish membership would help integrate
European Muslims proceeds from the assumption that an Islamic belonging in
Europe is achievable by the post-facto grafting on of a majority Muslim state.
The conflation of the institution of the EU with cultural and symbolic discourses
on intrinsic ‘Europeanness’ has become a commonplace, yet the place of Islam
within these terminologies is not correspondingly integrated. The discourse that
Bunting deploys does not assume that an intrinsic Islamic ‘Europeanness’ may
exist anterior to the debate on Turkish EU membership or indeed the integration
of a European Muslim ‘minority’. Which collectivity exists in such numbers and
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cohesiveness in Europe to construct a corresponding non-Muslim majority,
considering that cultural and religious affiliation are not necessarily coterminous,
is an implied question that goes unanswered in Bunting’s piece. A place of ‘right’
is not accorded to Islam because this position on the contested historical field of
Europe has been occupied by a subjectivity that, while advocating Turkish
membership, does so from a position of discursive power to absolve itself of any
obligation for self-definition (if not self-critique) and historical self-location and
to not, therefore, acknowledge its own finitude. This is a subjectivity that offers
generosity to Turkey as a worthy, but external, supplicant.
Reid (2005), writing in The Herald, noted that (then) British Prime Minister
Tony Blair and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw:
. . . send out all the right signals. They have the vision to see that Turkey has much
to offer the EU [whereas] former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was saying
the Turks belonged to a ‘different cultural domain from us’. Such attitudes were,
and are, unhelpful.
Yet, Reid proceeds to deploy and reproduce the very discourse of ‘Europe’ that
assigns Turkey to a ‘different cultural domain’, noting that ‘there remains
lurking in the dark corners of the European mindset a residual suspicion and
dislike of this fine country’. The subject position (the ‘European mindset’) that
excludes Turkey is left intact, its parameters and contingent appearance in
history remain undefined and unexamined because Reid’s statements are made
possible as truth claims by their emergence from a position of ‘right’. To invoke
the historicity of this position from which to speak would be to acknowledge
the limits of those truth claims. This ‘misrecognition of its own conditions’,
Zˇizˇek (1989, 68) points out, is productive of – is constitutive of – a
subjectivity’s sense of its own ‘ontological consistency’, the dissolution of which
is the necessary price for a reflexive examination of its own contingent historical
emergence. What must be stressed here is that this kind of intra-subjective self-
critique leaves the given-ness of the binary quite intact. So in making the case for
the ‘fine country’ of Turkey by criticising what he sees as the intolerance of the
‘European mindset’, Reid takes the position of a generous group member who
berates his fellows for not recognising the quality of a virtuous, but nonetheless
external, supplicant.
Reid goes on to support this argument by invoking ‘history’ and ‘civilisation’
in similarly generous, but fundamentally exclusionary, terms noting that,
‘it seemed that Europeans had never quite come to grips with the fall of
Constantinople 550 years ago’, referring to the Ottoman conquest of the Byzantine
capital in 1453. Yet he once more criticises the myopia of the ‘European mindset’
while reproducing it, stating that:
this was too often presented as a defeat for Christianity by the forces of barbarism.
Actually, it was not barbarism that triumphed, but an alternative civilisation.
Ottoman Turks had a rich literature and culture (Reid 2005).
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As Reid gallantly rescues the Ottoman reputation from charges of barbarism,
he nonetheless excludes by declaring that it was an alternative civilisation. What
requires no examination, or indeed explicit invocation, is precisely which
civilisation that of the Ottomans was an alternative to. This can occur because
Reid speaks from a subjectivity projecting itself backwards in time, effacing the
contingency of its occupation of discursive territory on a historical field called
Europe. ‘As soon as we enter the symbolic order’, Zˇizˇek (1989, 56) explains,
‘the past is always present in the form of historical tradition, and the meaning of
these traces is not given; it changes continually with the transformations of the
signifier’s network.’
Simply put, there was no single civilisation that could be called ‘Europe’ or
‘Christendom’ that the Ottomans were an alternative to. The expansion of the
Ottoman state in Anatolia and south-eastern Europe from the early fourteenth
century had been at the expense of the Byzantine Empire, where Orthodoxy
predominated. This latter was a milieu that had long been, in matters of politics,
faith and Greek high culture, distinct from the Latin West (Norwich 1998).
The image of Byzantium in Mediaeval Western Christendom was often, setting
aside religious difference, that of excessive, effete Oriental luxury and
sophistication (Lockman 2004, 15–17). Yet, recent scholarship argues that
pejorative discourses emphasising divisions among Latin Christendom, Orthodox
Byzantium and indeed Islam had their counterpoint in lived practices of cultural,
commercial and political exchange that point towards, by the Renaissance,
a picture of overlapping milieus (Jardine and Brotton 2000; Bisaha 2004;
MacLean 2005).
Byzantium had been partly influenced in high culture and court ritual by its
near neighbour and rival, the pre-Islamic Sassanian Empire of Iran (Wiesehofer
2001) while the much later Ottomans drew on aspects of Byzantine culture in
analogous terms (Findlay 2005, 111–12). Space does not permit a detailed
meditation on these points, but what Reid (2005) calls the ‘triumph of an
alternative civilisation’ can also legitimately be seen as the victory of an Ottoman
state whose star was in the ascendant within its own milieu. To reiterate, my
intention is not to unmask as fallacious the particularities of the recourse to
‘history’ in the discourse deployed by Reid, but to argue that his a discourse with
a history as well as rules governing the coherence of its statements. This
discourse of Europe, I suggest, superimposes itself upon a wider, more nuanced
and complex set of interlocking cultural and political milieus as if they did not exist.
This version of Europe constructs a grand narrative of stages of progress
(Shohat and Stam 1994, 14) beginning in Classical Greece and Rome, proceeding
to the establishment of the Latin Church, the Renaissance, Enlightenment and
thence to Modernity (Stra˚th 2002, 388). This is certainly an available, familiar
version of Europe but it is also a distinctly regional one, based as it is on the
territorial and confessional boundaries of the Western, Latin Church and its
post-Reformation offshoots. Ricoeur (1992, 117) characterised it as a European
specificity intertwining several heritages – Jewish–Christian, Greek–Roman,
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the ‘Barbarian’ invaders of Rome, Christendom, the Reformation, ‘the rock of
Renaissance Enlightenment’ as well as ‘nineteenth century components of
nationalism, socialism and romanticism’. Amin (1989, 10–11) undermines its
claims to longevity by locating it historically from the Renaissance, before which
‘Europe belonged to a regional tributary system that included Europeans and
Arabs, Christians and Muslims’.
The shift of the commercial and political centre of gravity in this milieu from
the Mediterranean to the Atlantic seaboard from the sixteenth century facilitated
the invention of the myth of an ‘eternal West’ which projected itself into the past,
appropriating Classical antiquity (Amin 1989, 90–91). As Majid (2000, 136)
maintains, Greece and its ancient civilisation were ‘(dis)Oriented and inscribed
into the new geography of the West’. That version of Europe is not coterminous
with Europe as it is currently geographically defined, ending at the Bosphorus and
petering out somewhere in the Urals (Davies 2007, 7), leaving out as it does those
regions that were confessionally and politically Orthodox and Byzantine; Islamic
and Ottoman. Yet, it remains durable even in critical academic discourse, such as
in Wilson and van der Dussen’s (1993) edited volume on the History of the idea
of Europe, where, in the index, Byzantium is referred to once, the Ottomans
thrice and Islam and Orthodoxy not at all.
Another approach, put forward by the cultural theorist Kristeva (2000,
116–17) might be described as a programmatic attempt to realign the boundaries
of exclusion where Europe is concerned. Recognising that a ‘set of questions for
European cultural identity’ is posed by the EU’s eastward expansion, she proposes
that ‘the Orthodox experience of subjectivity and freedom might . . . complete,
stimulate, and enrich Western experience’. Yet, as Almond (2007, 152–53) notes,
Islam has no place in Kristeva’s programme for the modified European
subjectivity made necessary by the expansion, realised and potential, of the EU
into the Balkans. Indeed, he observes that Kristeva draws equivalence between the
Fall of the Bastille and nineteenth century nationalist struggles against Ottoman
rule in the Balkans as key moments of liberation on the paths to freedom for her
Western and Orthodox subjectivities. That she does so by contrasting a ‘European
space of freedom’ with an ‘Oriental place of tyranny’ emphasises ‘the absence of
fluidity and mutability in Kristeva’s European subject’ (Almond 2007).
Certainly, the Ottoman/Islamic facts of Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo go
unmentioned in Kristeva’s theoretical expansion of the boundaries of European
subjectivity. Rarely a proselytising empire where its Jewish and Christian
subjects were concerned, notwithstanding the periodic (until the late seventeenth
century) Devs¸irme, or levy of Christian boys who, after conversion to Islam,
formed much of the Ottoman bureaucratic and military elite, there was no state
led attempt at mass conversion in the Balkans (Quataert 2005, 99). Indeed, under
the Ottoman’s devolved Millet system of communal self-government, the
spiritual and temporal power of the Orthodox Church was elevated to an extent
far beyond that of the latter years of Byzantium. As Bakic´-Hayden (2002, 68)
explains:
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As the institution of the Christian emperor disappeared with the fall of
Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, the patriarch was appointed [by the
Ottoman Sultan] not only as spiritual but also as a civil authority in charge of all the
Orthodox Christian population or Rum Millet, the Roman nation . . . the indifference
of the Ottomans to the ethnic, cultural and linguistic distinctions between the
various peoples of the empire helped affirm the catholicity, or universality, of the
Orthodox Church.
As Todorova (1996, 48–49) points out, voluntary conversions in the Balkans
happened for a variety of socio-economic and political reasons linked to Islam’s
dominant position in the Ottoman state as well as (one may reasonably presume)
the perceived spiritual appeal of the faith itself. This suggests the potential for an
intrinsic place for Islam and the Ottoman legacy in any project to extend the
boundaries of European subjectivity, and not simply as the lingering traces of an
alien conquest and oppressive presence. As Todorova (1996, 46) maintains, ‘it is,
therefore, preposterous to look for an Ottoman legacy in the Balkans. The Balkans
are (sic) the Ottoman legacy.’ Nor is her observation entirely novel since, as
Braudel (1973, 776) noted in 1949, ‘it is impossible to underestimate the impact
of the Turkish experience, to ignore its contribution to the Balkan bloc upon
which it left a profound cultural imprint’. Kristeva’s approach may constitute an
attempt to widen a putative European secular subjectivity’s reference to the
historical and religious fields that recent expansion in former Byzantine and
Ottoman territories opens up, but it is deliberately attenuated.
The implications of this expansion are unremarked upon, even in partial
Kristevan terms, in commentary such as that by Macintyre (2005a, 2005b),
writing in The Times on 30 September and 1 October. Comparing the cases
‘against and for’ Turkish EU membership, generosity is apparent even in the
former stance. The presence in Austria of lingering fears of ‘Ottoman Janissaries
at the gates of Vienna’, for example, is called ‘archaic and racist’ (Mcintyre
2005a). This was repeated in The Guardian (2005b), asserting that ‘Austrian
opposition to Turkish membership is a toxic blend of historical prejudice and
contemporary fear, of Ottoman Janissaries at the gates of Vienna, of Habsburg
nostalgia . . . ’ Yet, the particularity of these fears is not fully explored beyond the
criticism of a notion of Europeanness that externalises Islam and the Ottoman
legacy but which stops short of an interrogation of the very ontology of that
version of ‘European’ belonging. For example, what historical images do
European Muslims of former Ottoman territories like Albania and Bosnia have of
an empire whose religion was, by and large, not forced upon them and for which
they supplied those very Janissaries as well as much of high Ottoman officialdom
(Ortaylı 2004, 92)? A recent example of historical identification articulated
through sport (the Euro 2008 football tournament) indicates not, with Jelin (2008)
observing in The Guardian that:
many Bosnian Muslims back Turkey in international competitions for historical and
cultural reasons that date back to the five centuries of Ottoman rule in the Balkans,
while [Bosnian] Croats regard the Croatian national team as their own.
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Moreover, the Ottoman–Habsburg conflicts referred to can be seen, as Finkel
(2005, 285–86) argues, as intra-European (a longstanding Franco–Ottoman
alliance existed against Vienna), yet are couched in terms suggesting the perennial
onslaught of an outside force despite, by the second siege of 1683, over three
centuries of Ottoman rule in south-eastern Europe. This is unremarked upon when,
summing up the case for Turkish EU membership, Macintyre (2005b) states that:
a European Turkey, say the backers of Ankara’s effort, would show that there is
nothing inevitable about a ‘clash of civilisations’ between Islam and Christianity,
between Western and Eastern values. On the contrary, the melding of cultures might
just evolve into a Europe that is more rich, robust and varied.
Yet, this proceeds from an assumption that Islam and ‘Eastern values’ are not
already historically embedded within Europe. In criticising a European
subjectivity that is suspicious of Turkish membership, the call is to abandon
age old fears and prejudices and generously make room for the perennial ‘other’.
That the tropes of exclusion can be turned upon the EU itself in an exhortation to
extend a generous, yet strategically motivated, invitation to an honoured outsider
was also demonstrated by The Daily Telegraph on 4 October 2005. Referring to
Austrian objections, only overcome immediately prior to the deadline for the
commencement of Turkish accession talks, it stated:
The last-minute bickering was unedifying but hardly surprising in a union that has
repeatedly shown a dismaying lack of strategic sense over Turkey. It now has a
chance to redeem its reputation in good faith with a Muslim country that has boldly
persisted with its claim to a European future while the relationship between the
Islamic world and the West has soured. [European leaders are invited to] prepare
their electorates for the integration of a vibrant democracy that straddles the great
cultural divide of our age.
By congratulating Turkey’s boldness in pursuing a ‘European future’, no
acknowledgment is made of the possibility of advocating its case based on an
embedded, intrinsic European past. The idea of ‘Europe’ that the Telegraph piece
depends upon does not acknowledge its own historical specificity and regional
bounded-ness. It proceeds from its contingent position of right to speak self-
critically as Europe, but refuses to acknowledge the re-emergence of its finitude
from the historical field that the extension of EU membership to Romania,
Bulgaria, Cyprus and indeed Greece and potentially into other Ottoman successor
states heralds.
Conclusion
Expressing cautious relief in The Guardian that accession talks were to proceed
despite Austrian brinksmanship, Freedland (2005) spoke of ‘the EU’s latest grand
design – eastward expansion beyond Christendom’ without stating which
Christendom he refers to. That he means the Catholic and Protestant Western
variety (and its associated secular successor) is made plain when he proclaimed
that:
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the admission into the EU of a large Muslim democracy would represent the best
possible proof that there need be no clash of civilisations: no longer will the
jihadists be able to speak of the Christian west pitted against the Muslim rest.
Instead the EU, that quintessentially western club, will count as one of its biggest
members . . . a nation now ruled by an Islamist government.
Here, the historical presence of Eastern, Orthodox Christendom, much of
which for some six centuries was integrated into the Ottoman politico-cultural
milieu is effaced from the European subjectivity underwriting Freedland’s
statement. To reiterate, my suggestion is that a particular subjectivity, dependent
upon an authorising grand narrative encompassing Latin Christendom, the
Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment and Modernity, and which has
projected itself backwards to selectively appropriate the Classical Greco-
Roman past, has attained and maintains sufficient ‘territory’ on a contestable field
of power to efface its own historical contingency and regional specificity. By
occupying a position of ‘right’ to speak as Europe, it does so as if the expansion of
the EU into parts of Europe with an Byzantine–Orthodox, and subsequently
Ottoman-Islamic politico-cultural experience has no implication for the
fundamental reformulation of European subjectivity. The historical ontology of
‘Europe’ and the assumptions of religious unity it proceeds from, correctly
pointed out by Yeg˘enog˘lu (2006), deployed in this section of the British press, do
not correspond to the reality of recent EU expansion, fulfilled and potential.
To take full account of the historical and cultural implications of this, if such are to
inform future notions of European unity, would require that support for Turkish
EU membership, be reframed to take account of Turkey’s already existing,
historically locatable ‘right’ to an intrinsic ‘European-ness’. This is a potential
form of advocacy quite distinct from that proposed in this journal by Yeg˘enog˘lu
(2006) given that, rather than abandoning the past to conceive of a Turkish place in
Europe, it re-approaches history as a means to argue that Turkey is already there.
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